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Many child protection cases involve care-experienced mothers, which reveals a continuous 
cycle of mothers who lose their children to social services after having been in state care 
themselves as children. While the importance of protecting children requires little 
explanation and forms the justificatory basis for child protection interventions, it is important 
to remember that care-experienced mothers were once children entrusted to the state’s care, 
and who arguably have been failed by the state in that their parenting opportunities are 
significantly reduced. This paper aims to address this underexplored dilemma between 
protecting children and safeguarding mothering opportunities for care-experienced mothers. 
Appealing to the concept of solidarity, I argue that the state has an obligation to increase its 
compensatory efforts to secure the right of care-experienced women to not only become 
parents but to be able to be parents, with the aim of breaking the cycle of care experience.  
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Securing children’s welfare is a global priority and a key challenge of our times; not in the 
least because children form the very foundation of a sustainable society as tomorrow’s 
citizens. Although they do not explicitly address issues related to children or families, the 
United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) include several goals that are highly 
relevant to the lives of children and their families. These include Goals 3 (Health and Well-
being), 5 (Gender Equality), and 10 (Reduced Inequalities). Although the SDGs’ targets and 
indicators explicitly address sexual and reproductive health, they are remarkably silent on 
softer, social indicators relating to women, including their social rights as mothers.  
Yet maybe it is precisely this blind spot that poses a threat to both women’s and 
children’s rights, and the example of care-leaver mothers certainly suggest as much.1 It 
reveals a continuous chain of mothers who lose their children to social services after having 
been in public care as children themselves. These care-experienced mothers seem unable to 
break the cycle of child protection involvement in their families, leading history to repeat 
itself all too often. Research into child maltreatment met by state intervention in the form of 
child protection or child welfare services (CPS)2 shows that a large proportion of parents 
have a childhood history with CPS themselves (Jones, 2008). Sadly, such interventions, 
purportedly based on the child’s best interests, seem unable to safeguard the parenting 
prospects of children taken under the state’s protective wing. This contradicts the welfare 
state’s commitment to equalising opportunities, a goal which results inter alia from the 
implementation of the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) and which underpins 
much of the child protection system’s legitimacy through the principle of the child’s best 
interests (Art. 3, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989).  
If child protection interventions at least partly aim to equalise a child’s chance of a 
safe and healthy future, ostensibly protecting the ‘child’s best interests’, the fact that a 
woman’s past in public care increases the likelihood of CPS intervention suggests that her 
mothering opportunities have not been safeguarded. Of course, this is a simplistic summary, 
and correlation does not imply causality. But, it does hint at a normative assumption that a 
good/happy childhood is a prerequisite for good parenting - further supported by empirical 
evidence of childhood trauma being a risk-increasing parenting factor (Ward et al., 2012). 
Importantly, however, the same research clearly identifies mitigating factors that 
significantly reduce the risk of harm to the child (Ward et al., 2012). Nevertheless, a review 
of court judgments in several European countries reveals that  care history is frequently 
mentioned as a risk factor, but compensating factors are rarely considered (Krutzinna & 
Skivenes, 2020). This is concerning. On the one hand, the focus on protecting children seems 
justified; they occupy, after all, the most vulnerable position. But on the other hand, it is 
important to remember that these care-experienced mothers themselves were once children 
entrusted to the state’s care. Arguably, they have been failed by their public carers due to the 
significant reduction of their mothering opportunities.  
The present paper addresses this underexplored dilemma between protecting 
children and safeguarding mothering opportunities for care-experienced mothers. I argue that 
the position of women who left public care and started their own family is insufficiently 
 
1 The focus in this article is on women as future mothers; however, this is not to suggest that men as 
fathers do not have an important role to play in the child rearing and in shaping an adequate family 
environment. On the contrary, fathers’ critical role in children’s development is widely acknowledged 
(see e.g. Lamb et al., 1985). But given the present focus on child protection interventions, which often 
involve infants or very young children, mothers are prioritized because of their immediate impact on 
children through physical connectedness prior and immediately after birth. Additionally, there is an 
important gendered element: in child protection, mothers are often directly and indirectly blamed for 
the wrongdoings of fathers – particularly in cases of domestic violence  (Featherstone et al., 2018, p. 
129).  
2 Different terms are used to describe a country’s child protection / child welfare system (Burns et al., 




considered at this time. Appealing to the concept of solidarity, I contend that the state has an 
obligation to increase its compensatory efforts to secure the right of care-experienced women 
to not only become parents but to be able to be parents, with the aim of breaking the cycle of 
care experience.3 I begin with a short introduction of solidarity and the welfare state in 
general, followed by an in-depth discussion of these concepts in relation to child protection. 
Here, I critique the state’s lack of solidarity with care-experienced mothers and provide two 
perspectives to reveal its consequences: the point of view of care-experienced mothers and a 
children and children’s rights perspective. Doing so, I demonstrate how framing the problem 
in terms of solidarity identifies existing shortcomings.  In conclusion, I propose a first step 
towards improving the moral standing of care-experienced mothers and the protection of 
children’s right to future family life.  
 
Solidarity and the Welfare State 
The notion of solidarity has a long history in Europe. Not only has its definition changed over 
the course of past centuries, it also varies across cultural and political contexts (Stjernø, 
2009). Recently, until the Covid-19 pandemic hit Europe, the notion’s societal currency 
seemed mostly in decline (cf. Prainsack, 2020). Some have even argued that ‘[w]hile 
solidarity played a central role in the ideological and rhetorical defence of welfare state 
arrangements in the post-war period, the concept appeared to lose its attractiveness in the 
final decades of the last century’ (Houtepen & Ter Meulen, 2000, p. 330). Although these 
authors focus predominantly on the healthcare system, their analysis of contemporary threats 
to solidarity appear equally applicable to welfare states more broadly. Specifically, they 
identify three threats: first, the widening gap between current demands of the welfare system 
and the limited and conditional supply due to demographic changes (e.g. aging population, 
migration, socio-economic changes).4 Second, the shift from collective to individual 
responsibility, including the changing distribution of responsibility between state and 
individual citizen – which in turn results in a growing gap between well-off and lower income 
groups (with an important effect on the egalitarian status of our societies). And third, the 
individualisation of society, denoting an increased emphasis in society on the capacity of 
individuals to pursue their own interests and to develop their potentialities (Houtepen & Ter 
Meulen, 2000, p. 330ff.). Due to these developments and their likely harmful effects on the 
strength and stability of welfare states, the long absence of serious discussion on solidarity 
in the European debate seemed surprising (Houtepen & Ter Meulen, 2000, p. 333; Dawson 
& Verweij, 2012). In this context, clearly defining solidarity is a first step to address these 
challenges.  
Everyday uses of the term emphasise motifs of co-operation based on social 
cohesion, ‘a sense of non-calculating co-operation based on identification with a common 
cause’ (Houtepen & Ter Meulen, 2000, p. 334) – although this is but one of many different 
historical meanings of the term (Bayertz, 1999). Due to its articulation of unity in the face of 
shared challenges, reliance on the concept of solidarity may bring some much-needed 
direction for tackling the most significant problems of our time – like global social and 
ecological crises. However, this must be predicated on a comprehensive engagement with 
the concept and a deeper understanding of its role in modern welfare states. Moral and 
political philosophy have long been criticised for their disinterest in doing so, alongside more 
general contestations of their failure to connect philosophy to real political process, which 
continues to the present day (Bayertz, 1998, pp. 294–295). In the last decade, such criticism 
seems at least somewhat outdated, with solidarity-based discussions slowly re-emerging. In 
 
3 The focus here is on mothers with a full or partial history of a childhood in state care who have their 
child(ren) temporarily or permanently removed from their care by CPS.  
4 See for instance Tazzioli, M., & Walters, W. (2019) on solidarity and migration, and Zaidi, A., 





light of current global events, it may be welcomed that, recently, the concept of solidarity has 
gained some traction in the academic debate and has reappeared in relation to the current 
global climate and pandemic crises (e.g. The Lancet, 2020; United Nations Development 
Programme, 2007). 
Two of solidarity’s most prominent European proponents, Barbara Prainsack and 
Alena Buyx, have been calling for a renewed engagement with the concept for the last 
decade. According to their basic definition, solidarity signifies ‘shared practices reflecting a 
collective commitment to carry “costs” (financial, social, emotional, or otherwise) to assist 
others’ (Prainsack & Buyx, 2011, p. 46). As the authors point out, it is important to 
understand solidarity as a functional concept. It is ‘a practice not merely a sentiment or 
abstract value. Solidarity requires actions. Motivations and feelings such as empathy etc. are 
not sufficient to satisfy this understanding of solidarity, unless they manifest themselves in 
acts’ (Prainsack & Buyx, 2011, p. 46). They further extend this basic definition on three 
levels of solidarity. The first tier is the interpersonal level, and includes manifestations of the 
willingness to carry costs to assist others with whom a person recognises sameness or 
similarity in at least one relevant aspect. The second tier entails collective commitment, 
exemplified by carrying cost to assist others linked by a shared situation or cause. The third 
tier, finally, relates to the institutionalisation of solidarity in contractual or legal norms. The 
welfare state is an example of tier 3 solidarity, where ‘various shared values—such as a 
collective ideal of organizing appropriate care for disabled or diseased persons—are backed 
up and solidified in legal rules, specifying and possibly enforcing rights and obligations of 
citizens’ (Dawson & Verweij, 2012, p. 3). Prainsack and Buyx describe a certain 
interdependence when it comes to tier 3 solidarity: although theoretically, all tiers can exist 
independently from one another, meaning that tier 3 solidarity could be institutionalised even 
in the absence of tier 1 and 2 solidarity, in practice this is likely to prove unacceptable to 
society (Prainsack & Buyx, 2016, pp. 88–89). This institutionalised solidarity in the form of 
welfare systems in practice builds on interpersonal and group solidarity at the lower levels 
(Prainsack & Buyx, 2016, pp. 91–92).  
While the most obvious arena for solidarity at play may be healthcare and the labour 
market, institutionalised solidarity is equally relevant to other areas of the welfare state, such 
as social care and child protection. While all areas of social welfare can be seen as highly 
correlated in the sense that a lack of social well-being (e.g. poverty) is associated with poor 
health outcomes (e.g. Vaalavuo, 2016), and poor health in turn leads to detrimental social 
outcomes, it is important to evaluate solidarity in social care in its own right, because this 
allows us to explore what difference connecting solidarity to social care makes to our lives. 
For present purposes, the specific question becomes how thinking about the child protection 
system in terms of solidarity changes the lives of the children and families affected by it.  
 
Solidarity in Child Protection 
Legally, the obligation to secure children’s well-being and safeguard their rights is rooted in 
the CRC,5 which in addition to specifying concrete rights, sets out four principles to guide a 
general attitude towards children and their rights (UNICEF, 2019). States are required to 
implement measures, or a system, to protect children from all forms of maltreatment “while 
in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child” 
(Art.19, CRC). In response, many states have implemented a child protection system and 
granted its agencies wide powers to intervene where a child is deemed at risk, or where their 
rights are infringed – often with the consequence that other citizens’ (e.g., parents’) freedom 
is restricted. Effective child protection remains a key challenge for the state, whose 
responsibility it is to safeguard children's rights and who must strike the right balance 
between too much and too little intervention in the otherwise private lives of their citizens. 
Modern welfare states, with their emphasis on equalising opportunities, have put in place 
 




strong child protection services (CPS) as part of their social welfare systems. But this formal 
commitment to reducing inequalities is increasingly challenged by a growing societal 
emphasis on individual responsibility for well-being and life success and the reconfiguration 
of social problems as individual problems - ‘the individualisation of society’ (Houtepen & 
Ter Meulen, 2000). Against this stands the common understanding that responsibility for 
children’s upbringing rests not only with parents but also with the state, which besides legal 
obligation included in the CRC, also has a clear interest in ensuring the healthy development 
of future citizens.6 This safeguarding, in the form of child (welfare) protection, is thus one of 
the most important tasks of the welfare state. While much of the day-to-day child rearing is 
carried out by parents, the state maintains a supervisory role and shares moral and legal 
responsibility for children’s well-being. Where sufficiently serious concerns arise about the 
health and safety of the child, the state will make use of its most intrusive power to intervene 
in the private sphere of family life, a domain strongly protected by human rights (e.g. 
European Convention on Human Rights, 1953). As ultima ratio, the state may terminate 
parental responsibility, and temporarily or permanently remove a child from their parents. 
The legal justification for this exercise of power is found in the child’s best interests principle 
(Art. 3, CRC). As one of four guiding principles in children’s rights protection, it plays an 
important role, despite criticisms concerning its lack of clarity (Kelly, 2005; Krutzinna, 
2019). In its General Comment No. 14, the CRC Committee (2013) has expanded on the 
meaning of the principle and emphasised the rights of children in a ‘vulnerable situation’, 
including ‘victims of abuse’. Logically, this includes children who have experienced neglect 
or abuse and who, as a result, grow up in public care (e.g. with foster carers or in a children’s 
home). The CRC clarifies that children in care are entitled ‘to special protection and 
assistance provided by the State’ (Art. 20, CRC), and that all have a right ‘to the enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness and 
rehabilitation of health’ (Art. 24, CRC). With regard to the latter, the CRC further specifies 
measures states must take to fully implement this right, including appropriate pre- and post-
natal healthcare for mothers, information, education and support concerning basic child 
health and nutrition, and the development of preventive healthcare, guidance for parents and 
family planning education and services (Art. 24, CRC).  
Unsurprisingly, the legal protection afforded by the CRC is child-centric, although 
modest reference is made to the rights of mothers insofar they affect child health. This 
illustrates the connection between mothers and children and the interrelatedness of their well-
being. It is precisely this link that causes CPS to come in when mothers struggle with 
parenting responsibilities. In extreme cases, when the only way to protect the child’s best 
interests is deemed to be to remove them from their family,7 the state will assume 
responsibility for the child’s well-being - which for practical purposes will often be delegated 
to foster parents or a public care facility for children. But where does the responsibility for a 
child in public care end, and when? Given the evidence about the potentially perpetuating 
effect of care experience, does the welfare state have an obligation to conceptualise children 
in care as future parents in care and support them accordingly? Based on the notion of tier 3 
solidarity, I argue that the welfare state has a duty to assist in breaking the cycle and to prepare 
children in care for their potential future as parents. This obligation is further supported by 
 
6 Outside of the predominantly individualistic approach of Western countries, communities and society 
as a whole also have a share in the raising of children, as the oft-cited African proverb ‘It takes a whole 
village to raise a child’ suggests. 
7 Such extreme cases include direct physical or sexual violence towards the child and other imminent 
threats to the health and life of the child, but in other situations it may not be so clear whether the 
removal of the child from her mother is necessary ‘in her best interests’. The reality of many child 
protection cases is unfortunately one of preventing (further) serious harm, rather than a question of what 
is best in an ideal world, which would be for all children to grow up in a loving family environment 




children’s rights, which emphasise a right to have their interests protected, including the 
option to be parents, if they so choose. These two aspects will be subsequently considered.  
 
Solidarity with care-experienced mothers 
Given the basic definition of solidarity as ‘shared practices reflecting a collective 
commitment to carry “costs” (financial, social, emotional, or otherwise) to assist others’ 
(Prainsack & Buyx, 2011), and the foregoing discussion of solidarity and the welfare state, 
child protection interventions may be seen as an example of such shared practices. Such 
practices are supported by certain values, including the notion that societies have a collective 
responsibility towards children as a group vulnerable to actions and non-actions. State 
intervention into family life is therefore justified when the public power exerted against 
private individuals serves to protect children. Legally, this is covered by the child’s best 
interests principle, as discussed above. Rooted in the CRC,  this view is today reflected in 
most national legal frameworks (Skivenes & Sørsdal, 2018). The child’s best interests 
principle is normative, but does not prescribe specific actions that must be taken with regard 
to children’s upbringing. However, it does stipulate that some societal ‘costs’ need to be 
incurred to safeguard children and their rights. In a sense then, the principle represents a 
codified expression of solidarity towards children, based on the basic working definition 
offered by Prainsack and Buyx. Mothers appear only insofar their child-bearing role and 
immediate impact on the child’s health is concerned (see Art. 24 CRC, above).  
Care-experienced mothers are women who have outgrown the public care system 
and have started a family of their own. The unfortunate fact of a troubled childhood often 
serves as a red flag if social or child welfare services become involved, and many mothers 
subject to child protection interventions are care-experienced (Jones, 2008; Ward et al., 2012; 
Krutzinna & Skivenes, 2020). There may be some intuitive logic in this. The idea of a 
troubled childhood leading to problems in adulthood is a persistent, albeit not always 
accurate, narrative in public discourse. Childhood trauma has in fact proved a risk factor, 
impacting parenting capacity and competency (Jones, 2008; Ward et al., 2012; WHO, 2020). 
But at the same time, research also shows that a mother’s adaptation to a history of abuse 
significantly reduces the risk of future harm to the child (Ward et al., 2012). This indicates 
that something can be done to improve mothering prospects for these women, albeit not all 
of them.8 The implication of this finding is two-fold: first, solidarity with care-experienced 
mothers requires the welfare state to dedicate some of its resources to helping these women 
to be and act as mothers.9 This would be a significant step in equalising their opportunities 
to life full lives as women and mothers, if they wish to take on this additional role. Particular 
support for this argument comes from the fact that as children, these women were in public 
care and thus under the immediate influence of the welfare state’s actions; considerably more 
so than children raised in their first families. Second, based on knowledge about the existence 
of cross-generational family child protection involvement, there is a strong solidarity-based 
argument to focus on pre-emptive measures that target children’s future parenting capacities. 
Since research shows that adaptation to childhood trauma can mitigate risks of future harm 
to children (Ward et al., 2012; see further McLaughlin & Lambert, 2017), solidarity requires 
a practical commitment to assist with such adaptation. I will return to this second aspect in 
the next section, first addressing the equalisation argument.  
Although there is evidence that something can be done to improve the parenting 
capacities of mothers who have experienced neglect and/or abuse during childhood, there is 
 
8 The reasons behind a mother’s struggles to parent her child are often multifactorial and rarely only 
caused by her own difficult childhood. For instance, substance misuse and mental health issues are 
common reasons why a child is deemed unsafe with her mother, and most CPS interventions occur 
when there is a combination of serious risk factors in the absence of sufficient risk-mitigating factors 
(Ward et al., 2012).  
9 There is also an argument of consistency to be made here, given that most states already help women 




a significant knowledge gap that needs to be overcome before effective measures can be 
designed and implemented. This relates to the lack of research on women’s experiences, 
particularly in relation to the involvement of child protection services, which can be an 
emotional and stigmatising affair as such (e.g. Thrana & Fauske, 2014). But this is potentially 
exacerbated for women who grew up in public care themselves, as foster care status itself 
often comes with significant stigmatisation, to the extent that some children try to keep it a 
secret (e.g. Dansey et al., 2019). In addition, a review of the evidence on mothers’ 
experiences of compulsory removal of babies at birth found very limited research into this 
topic (Marsh et al., 2015). This is troubling because a woman forced to give up her child 
clearly remains a mother, despite what her formal legal status may suggest or how others 
perceive her. Here, feminist philosopher Drucilla Cornell points to a woman’s right as a 
person: 
 
To rob her of her chance to struggle through what meaning being a mother still has 
for her is to put the state, and not the woman, as the master over the construction of 
her sense of who she is. Birth mothers have rights, not as birth mothers, but as 
persons who, like all others, must be allowed the space to come to terms with their 
own life-defining decisions about sexuality and family (2005, p. 28) 
 
A solidarity-based approach would suggest that what Cornell describes as the ‘space to come 
to terms with’ (2005, p. 28) should include assistance with the experience of losing primary 
care of a child. The removal of a child should not be followed by a loss of all rights as a 
mother, which should not be based on biological motherhood but on personhood (Cornell, 
2005, p. 30). While bereaved mothers are often offered specialist psychosocial support 
services, women whose children are removed by child protection services receive no such 
support (Chapman, 2003). While the two situations are obviously not identical, the feelings 
of grief and loss are somewhat comparable (Charlton et al., 1998; Mayes & Llewellyn, 2012). 
That a decision to remove a child is deemed necessary in the best interests of the child does 
not diminish the need for solidarity with the mother, who in addition to our compassion, is 
entitled to relevant support.  
Fortunately, societies have little trouble to empathize with children. But once these 
children grow up and become parents themselves, their origin as children of the welfare state 
is often overlooked, and interest shifts entirely to the new generation of children who must 
be taken into public care to protect their best interests. To break this cycle of interventions, 
we need to reflect on our failures towards the mothers and perceive children currently in care 
as future mothers (and fathers) who require assistance in developing adequate parenting 
capacities. These women are currently excluded from our considerations and ‘othered’ in our 
society, and must become included again. Doing better by those mothers is doing better by 
the children and helping care-experienced mothers thus also becomes a case of children’s 
rights. Consequently, the argument for solidarity comes full circle.  
 
Solidarity with future mothers in care 
In welfare states, the state is given great powers to intervene in citizens’ private lives in return 
for a commitment to provide them with equal opportunities. This obligation to maximally 
equalise opportunities for all citizens includes the opportunity to become a parent and to be 
- in the sense of acting as - a parent. If mothers who were once in public care are less likely 
to be competent at parenting, the state ought to be more future-oriented and invest in 
improving the parenting capacities of future mothers currently in care. This claim is further 
supported by the state’s obligation to look after those under its direct care. Indeed, a failure 
to address the revolving door of child protection services in those families may be interpreted 
as negligence on behalf of the welfare state. The complete lack of research into the right of 
children in care to be supported in building and developing parenting capacities for their 




component of the child’s right to respect for family life, which at least morally, if not legally, 
includes a right to future parenting prospects. In this sense, it is unsurprising that, to date, 
there appear to be no systematic interventions targeting children’s future abilities to parent. 
While some have argued that the psychological needs of children in care ought to be assessed 
routinely (e.g. Garwood & Close, 2001), support measures are typically offered to the foster 
carers rather than the children themselves.10 Little is known, moreover, about which 
interventions may be effective (Racusin et al., 2005). Where psychological support is offered 
directly to the child, it typically focuses on a narrow aspect of life, such as educational 
attainment (Tideman et al., 2011).  
An objection to putting in place broader interventions that cover a wider range of 
life areas might be that this is highly intrusive. Instead, one might argue, emphasis should go 
to the narrow spheres of health and education - with further reaction warranted only when 
serious challenges arise. Against this, I suggest that such a passive approach could be 
equivalent to implicitly preventing many children in care from ever assuming the role of 
parent. These children, like all others, need an opportunity to develop the necessary 
competences to be and act as parents, but we know forming and maintaining stable 
relationships, emotional security and trust are often more challenging for children in care. 
Because these are preconditions for good parenting, they reveal an obvious potential 
opportunity for early intervention. Once a child is born to a care-experienced mother, it may 
be too late to compensate past bad experiences and missed opportunities to learn essential 
family life skills. This is why thinking about the child’s right to respect for family life as 
including the right to respect for future family life and a right to safeguarding of parenting 
prospects, helps with grasping what is at stake, even if this is not what legal instruments such 
as the European Convention on Human Rights specify (see Art. 8, European Convention on 
Human Rights, 1953). 
A solidarity-based approach proposes that the state has a responsibility to protect 
children’s future family life opportunities through timely and adequate assistance. What this 
might entail precisely will need to be determined, first by conducting comprehensive research 
addressing the current knowledge gap about the needs of children in care for a future role as 
parents, and second, by developing corresponding evidence-based measures and support 
programmes. Of course, some mothers might still be unable to care for their children, 
regardless of any interventions during her childhood in care or beyond. This is because real 
lives are much more complicated, and, as mentioned above, most mothers at risk of having a 
child removed from their care will experience a multitude of challenges. However, the state’s 
obligation is not to do the impossible, but to assist with laying the foundation for future 
parenting skills by removing as many of the inequalities as possible for the children in its 
care. And as Prainsack and Buyx rightly emphasise, solidarity is a functional concept – it 
requires action from the state. Mere feelings of compassion with former children in care once 
they are care-experienced mothers will not suffice.  
 
Conclusion 
Even if some claim that solidarity is an elusive concept (Häyry, 2005, p. 202), the example 
of care-experienced mothers shows that it can provide a useful tool to conceptualise the 
welfare state’s obligations towards individuals. In this article, I have emphasised the 
difference thinking about solidarity could make to mothers who grew up in public care, and 
to children currently under state care. But there are plenty of additional arguments to support 
my primary claim that the state should act to break the cycle of CPS interventions in families, 
such as economics or human rights. There is something special, however, about solidarity, in 
that it requires us to focus on similarities between us and others, which starkly contrasts 
tendencies to create categories that define differences, and signals a shift away from 
 
10 This is not to say that such measures do not emphasise the child’s needs; however, children are not 




‘othering’. It thus captures the relationality of humans, including across generations, which 
pure right-based or egalitarian approaches tend to neglect. Current appeals for solidarity are 
based on a growing awareness of how complex global challenges, such as climate change, 
can only be solved in human unity. Some paint a gloomy picture, proclaiming ‘the general 
erosion and delegitimation of the social democratic welfare state’, leading to the loss of ‘the 
concept of solidarity in the moral imagination of contemporary society’ (Jennings & Dawson, 
2015, p.33). This paper has been an attempt at its revival by bringing it into the sphere of 
child protection, where part of the problem appears to stem from society’s treatment of the 
issue mostly as a problem between two individuals, rather than a complex network of 
relations that transcends the mother-child-dyad.11 A solidarity-based approach would enable 
us to understand both challenges and opportunities from a relational perspective, including 
the state as one crucial relation in the context of care-experienced mothers: Outside of the 
dyad, what resources might be harnessed that could better equip these mothers for their 
parenting role? In other parts of the world, this idea is already culturally engrained: for 
instance, the Swahili proverb ‘Asiye funzwa na mamae hufunzwa na ulimwengu’ roughly 
translates to “whomsoever is not taught by the mother will be taught with the world” 
(Townsend, 2019, p. ix), and signifies our collective responsibility for the upbringing of all 
children as ‘our’ children (Woodhouse, 2020, p. 93). 
My modest proposal for the path towards solidarity with current and future care-
experienced mothers is twofold. First, the welfare state ought to treat mothers whose children 
are removed from their care like other groups that experience grief and loss. Psychosocial 
support to work through the experience and to adjust the sense of self and identity would be 
a starting point. Welfare states as ‘institutional embodiments of social solidarity’ have a 
moral duty to help those in need,  and citizens often also have a legal claim in the form of 
welfare rights to such support (Boshammer & Kayß, 1998, p. 381). In healthcare, such 
welfare rights already exist. Maybe it is time to expand them to child protection and to act in 
solidarity with care-leaver mothers. Second, the state should begin to conceptualise children 
in care as future parents, many of whom currently come into contact with social and child 
protection services again in their adult lives. I have argued for an extension of children’s 
rights to also encompass the right to protection of future parenting prospects, especially for 
children in public care. As a consequence, the state would be under an obligation to pre-
emptively address care-experiencing children’s ability to parent, by addressing deficits in 
familial relationship building, attachment or other relevant aspects, way before they 
materialise as parenting deficits.  
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